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Abstract 
On 1 August 2005, a Boeing Company 777-200 aircraft, 
operating on an international passenger flight from Australia to 
Malaysia, was involved in a significant upset event while flying 
on autopilot. The Australian Transport Safety Bureau’s 
investigation into the event discovered that “an anomaly existed 
in the component software hierarchy that allowed inputs from a 
known faulty accelerometer to be processed by the air data 
inertial reference unit (ADIRU) and used by the primary flight 
computer, autopilot and other aircraft systems.”  This anomaly 
had existed in original ADIRU software, and had not been 
detected in the testing and certification process for the unit.  This 
paper describes the software aspects of the incident in detail, and 
suggests possible implications concerning complex, safety-
critical, fault-tolerant software. 
1 Introduction 
Software plays an increasingly significant role in avionics.   The 
rapid growth of this technology provides manufacturers and 
operators with a degree of flexibility that would not otherwise be 
possible.   The introduction of software systems also enables 
rapid reconfiguration of key applications during both 
development and the operational life of an airframe.  This 
flexibility also enables a high degree of fault tolerance.  
Software systems may detect potential failures and avert 
mishaps through the use of redundancy.   However, the 
introduction of new technologies often creates new hazards.  
This paper describes how the development of fault tolerant 
software can mask previous failures.  Redundant systems have 
enabled aircraft to continue in operation for many months after 
an initial fault has occurred.  If uncorrected, this creates the 
latent conditions for an accident when the software cannot 
respond to further system failures. 
 
To illustrate some of the potential dangers associated with fault 
tolerant software, we use a case study involving an in-flight 
mishap on a Boeing 777-200.   During the climb after take-off 
the crew observed a LOW AIRSPEED advisory and a slip/skid 
indication.   Their Primary Flight Display then indicated that 
they were simultaneously approaching a stall and the aircraft’s 
overspeed limit.   Such conflicting indications can undermine the 
crews’ confidence in their systems.  The aircraft pitched up and 
systems began to indicate a decrease in airspeed from 270 to 158 
knots.  Eventually the flight crew regained control of the aircraft, 
and the aircraft returned to Perth.  The flight data recorder 
indicated unusual acceleration values for all three planes of 
movement [1].   These values were provided by the Air Data 
Inertial Reference Unit and affected a range of aircraft systems 
during both automated and manual flight.   This paper describes 
the way in which software contributed to the potential accident. 
A further motivation for studying this incident is that near 
misses provide an opportunity to learn about the causes of 
potential accidents before there is any loss of life. 
 
The flexibility of avionics software has also increased the 
complexity of avionics.  This presents considerable barriers to 
accident investigators who must piece together the complex 
events and contributory factors that led towards an adverse 
event.  For this reason, we use Events and Causal Factors (ECF) 
diagrams to provide an overview of the case study incident.   
This approach helps to map key areas of the many pages of text 
that are used in the official report [3].   ECF diagrams were 
originally developed by the US Department of Energy.  It is 
important to stress, however, that this is only one of several 
different notations that might be used to provide a similar 
overview [4].  The focus here is less on the technique used for 
the analysis than on the role that ‘fault tolerant’ software played 
in the causes of a potential accident.  
 
(3) Power cycle on ADIRU 
(occurs each occasion aircraft 
electrical system is shutdown and 
restarted) 
(3) June 2001, accelerometer #5 
fails with erroneous high output 
values, Air Data Inertial 
Reference Unit (ADIRU) 
disregards accelerometer output 
values. 
(3) August 2005, accelerometer 
#6 fails, latent software anomaly 
allows use of previously failed 




Figure 1: High-Level Overview of the Case Study 
Incident 
 
2 Overview of the Incident 
Figure 1 illustrates the immediate events that contributed to the 
case study incident.  The focus here is not on identifying a cause 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20070034017 2019-08-30T01:52:23+00:00Z
for the accident but simply on establishing a more detailed 
timeline for the sketch that was presented in the introduction.  
The number that is used to label each box in the ECF diagram 
refers to the page on which that event is described in the 
Australian Transport Safety Bureau’s official report [1].  This 
enables readers to use these diagrams to support the more 
detailed analyses of the textual documentation.   The diamond 
indicates the eventual outcome of the events that lead to it. 
 
As can be seen, the initial events may be traced back more than 
four years before the mishap. Accelerometer number 5 failed 
with erroneous high output values.  The Air Data Inertial 
Reference Unit (ADIRU) software was programmed to disregard 
such output from the accelerometer and, instead, to rely on 
values from backup systems.   The initial failure was, however, 
masked following a restart of the ADIRU.   This created a 
vulnerability that was compounded by a latent software error – 
or bug.   Following the failure of another accelerometer the 
ADIRU could revert to accepting input from the accelerometer 
that had initially failed and been excluded from its computations.  
This scenario contributed to the failure that is described in the 
opening sections of the paper.  
3 Air Data Inertial Reference Unit Architecture 
Figure 2 provides an overview of the architecture that supports 
the Air Data Inertial Reference Unit (ADIRU) on the B777.   A 
core concept was to exploit redundancy as a means of achieving 
fault tolerance.   The unit was divided into seven fault 
containment modules or areas.  Each of these was physically and 
electrically isolated from the others.   The intention was that the 
aircraft could have a fault in any of the modules and still remain 
serviceable.   This feature would enable operators to continue 
flying until the number of fault-free modules fell below a 
minimum specified by the component manufacturer.  This fault 
tolerance supported lower operating costs, for instance, by 
reducing the potential disruption to aircraft operations from 
unscheduled maintenance.   In particular, the ADIRU used a 
fault containment module to analyze data from accelerometers 
and gyros before passing them through the ARINC 629 units to 
navigation and flight control systems.    
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Figure 2: Air Data Inertial Reference Unit (ADIRU) 
Architecture (ATSB, 2007, p.5)  
 
4 Redundancy & Fault Masking 
Figure 3 builds on the previous analysis and illustrates how the 
architecture and design objectives for the ADIRU software 
contributed to the case study incident.   As in Figure 1, the 
rectangles represent events leading to the mishap and page 
numbers in the ATSB report are indicated in parentheses.   The 
ovals denote contributory factors.  These provide a short-hand 
representation for many individual events that together create the 
preconditions for an incident.  For example, many aspects of this 
mishap can be traced back to the initial aim of reducing 
operating costs and disruption to aircraft scheduling.  This 
created a condition in which designers developed fault 
containment areas or modules that enabled operators to defer 
maintenance until the number of faulty Fault Containment Units 
exceeded specified tolerances. 
 
The left–hand chain of events captures elements of the ECF 
diagram shown in Figure 1; including the initial failure of 
accelerometer number 5 in 2001 and the subsequent failure of 
number 6 in 2005 that triggered the mishap.   As can be seen, 
however, Figure 3 significantly extends the analysis in the 
previous diagram.  For example, it refers to the Secondary 
Attitude Air Data Reference Unit (SAARU).  This extends the 
concepts of redundancy and of defence in depth by providing an 
alternate source of attitude, heading and air data to the ADIRU.   
A comparison was made between the output of the ADIRU and 
the SAARU during the mishap and this helped to mitigate the 
impact of the incorrect values from the ADIRU.  This illustrates 
an important point in this paper – the aim is not to undermine the 
use of fault tolerance and redundancy but instead to demonstrate 
the particular dangers of software masking component failures 
both to operational crews and maintenance teams.   In this case, 
it can be argued that the redundant SAARU provided sufficient 
control for the pilot to avert more serious consequences from the 
ADIRU faults. 
 
The right side of Figure 3 looks more closely at maintenance 
issues in the case study incident.   The initial failure of 
accelerometer number 5 in 2001 triggered a maintenance 
message on the on-board maintenance computer; this was known 
as an ADIRU MM 34-20010 event.  Such messages could be 
read by maintenance teams using a ground-based terminal but 
were not directly visible to the crew.   Some ADIRU events can, 
however, be displayed in-flight on the Engine Indication and 
Crew Alerting System (EICAS).   If such an in-flight warning 
occurs, then the ADIRU must be replaced with a serviceable unit 
within three days.   As can be seen in Figure 3, the crew did not 
receive such a warning following the 2001 accelerometer failure 
and so the ADIRU was not replaced.   However, the ECF 
diagram also denotes that different operators implemented 
different practices and risk mitigation strategies following such 
MM events.   The aircraft manufacturer noted that: “the ADIRU 
can be dispatched with MM 34-20010 present until such time 
that the operator deems it prudent to remove the ADIRU to 
avoid a schedule interruption due to occurrence of the ADIRU 
Status message. The decision to remove the ADIRU based on 
the presence of MM 34-20010 only is made by the operators on 
an economic basis, not a safety basis” [1, p.8]. 
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Figure 3: Maintenance Not Required to Replace Fault Tolerant ADIRU 
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(3) Power cycle on ADIRU 
(occurs each occasion 
aircraft electrical system is 
shutdown and restarted) 
(7) Jan 2005, OPS 
version -07 loaded 
onto ADIRU 
(8) There is a bug in ADIRU 
OPS up to and including v-07 
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(6) Faults on ADIRU 
generate maintenance 
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maintenance computer 
(MM 34-20010 event). 
(8) Memory recording 
maintenance message 
not checked by ADIRU 
during start-up 
sequence. 




(8) Software error 
masked by other 
functions in OPS 
v-03. (8) Need to improve shop 
repair capability leads to 
flaw being exposed again 
in OPS v-04. 
(8) From OPS v-04 changes to 
Fault Detection and Isolation 
software to detect transient 
faults and allow return to 
service if no further problems 
(5) FCAs allow  
operators to defer 
maintenance until number 
of faulty Fault 
Containment Units 
exceed tolerances. 
(5) Pressures to  
reduce operating costs and 
disruption to aircraft 
scheduling. 
(3) 1 August 2005, 
accelerometer #6 fails 
(3) Data from failed accelerometer 
#5 can be used after #6 fails 
(9) Mid-value select moderates 
anomalous output from ADIRU even 
though it was considered unnecessary 
during analysis and testing!  
 
Figure 4: Software Propagates Failure and Mitigates Adverse Effects 
 
5 Software Architecture and Fault Masking 
Figure 4 focuses on the software issues that contributed to the in-
flight mishap.  As before, many of the particular events can be 
traced back to pressures to reduce operating costs and avoid 
disruption to aircraft scheduling.   This created the Fault 
Containment Area architecture that enabled maintenance to be 
deferred.  It also led to software requirements for the ADIRU so 
that the system would check the status of critical components but 
allow the unit to continue operation if minimum criteria for the 
availability of FCAs were met.   The implementation of this 
software requirement was flawed in early versions of the OPS – 
software.   However, up to version v-03 this problem was 
mitigated by additional checks in other areas of the application.   
A renewed requirement to improve shop repair capability led to 
the flaw being exposed again in OPS v-04.   The OPS software 
up to and including v-07, therefore, contained a bug such that 
after a power cycle the ADIRU would not recognise that 
accelerometer number 5 was unserviceable. 
 
Figure 4 also denotes how a maintenance message was generated 
following the 2001 fault on accelerometer number 5.  However, 
the fault status was not checked by the ADIRU following a 
power up for the reasons presented previously.    This 
combination of events led to use of data from the failed 
accelerometer when a further fault was detected in 2005 with 
accelerometer number 6.  Again, however, this incident reveals 
how the ‘defence in depth’ techniques of modern avionics 
helped to mitigate the potential consequences of this bug.   The 
ADIRU software had been designed to pass on mid-range values 
if components provided data that varied between two 
implausible extremes.  It is important to stress that designers 
may underestimate the value of the defences they create.   The 
bottom event in Figure 4 records that this additional safety 
feature was considered to be superfluous during testing and 
analysis of the ADIRU.  
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Figure 5: Fault-Masking Undermines Crew Interaction 
6 Human Factors Issues 
Figure 5 illustrates how the impact of software bugs propagates 
beyond the embedded systems of modern avionics to affect crew 
interaction.   The ECF diagram illustrates how the silent masking 
of redundant failures undermined the ability of human operators 
to diagnose and respond to the problems that confronted them.   
Page 15 of the ATSB report describes how the crew was faced 
with incorrect underspeed warnings, followed by overspeed 
warnings, as well as a full right slip/skid indication following the 
failure of accelerometer number 6.  At the same time, correct 
indications were presented for the pitch and roll values on the 
primary flight display.  Standby equipment was also unaffected 
by the fault.   The crew were, therefore, unsure which of the 
instruments to trust.  Their uncertainty was exacerbated by 
design decisions that stemmed from the underlying philosophy 
of masking redundant failures during continued operations, 
mentioned in previous sections.   Figure 5 records that previous 
aircraft types had provided checklists for UNRELIABLE 
AIRSPEED in the crews’ Quick Reference Handbooks (QRH).   
However, the redundancy implemented by the B777 software 
systems implied that the crew should never be faced with such 
an indication.   The system was designed to ensure that 
unreliable input from key components should automatically 
trigger a transition to redundant systems without any 
intervention from the crew. It was reasonable, therefore, to argue 
that this section should be dropped from the QRH.  Crews often 
complain when documentation is unnecessarily verbose or 
difficult to navigate.  It was possible for multiple failures to 
trigger a NAV AIR DATA SYS message on the EICAS.  The 
QRH then referred the crew to an unreliable airspeed table.  
However, this particular warning was not triggered during the 
case study incident.  The key point here is that the problems 
facing the crew were exacerbated by the decision to mask 
information that designers did not consider would be needed by 
the crew.   However, the circumstances of this mishap reiterate 
the importance of providing some degree of visibility to the crew 
when it is difficult or impossible to guarantee the resilience of 
fault tolerant systems [6]. 
 
Figure 6 continues the analysis of crew interaction in the 
aftermath of the 2005 auto throttle failure.    As mentioned, the 
pilot was faced with a situation that designers had not considered 
to be possible.   The auto throttle system remained active and the 
underspeed/overspeed warnings suggested that the malfunction 
may have been related to these functions.  In consequence, the 
pilot attempted to disconnect the autothrottle by pressing the 
thrust lever disconnect switch and pushing the autothrottle 
engage switch to toggle it off.  However, these attempts were 
ineffective because the crew failed to switch the autothrottle arm 
switch from ARMED to OFF.   In consequence, the autothrottle 
continued to increase thrust in response to the low-speed data 
that was erroneously being supplied from the ADIRU and the 
fault accelerometer.  The interaction difficulties faced by the 
aircrew when attempting to disarm the autothrottle are typical of 
the ways in which the stress imposed on a human operator by an 
initial failure can trigger further mistakes.   These errors serve to 
compound the problems created by an initial mishap.   Figure 6 
illustrates how the crew now not only had to understand the 
reasons for the erroneous and inconsistent readings from their 
instrumentation, they now had to find an explanation for their 
failure to disarm the auto throttle.   Without additional support 
from documentation, such as the QRH, it can be difficult for any 
crew to avoid a gradual loss of situational awareness through 
apparent interactions between such compound failures.  
(2) Autothrottle increases thrust of 
engines in response to warning. 
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(15) Pilot in command attempts to 
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(15) Autothrottle remains 
active 
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 deselect autothrottle arm 




Figure 6: Auto Throttle Uncertainty Further Undermines Situation Awareness  
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Figure 7: Process-Based Certification and the Selection of Test Cases 
7 Certification Issues 
Figure 7 illustrates some of the certification-related issues that 
were raised by the case study incident.   It notes that DO-178B 
[7] and the European ED-12B equivalent were derived from 
joint working groups within the RTCA and the predecessor of 
the European Organisation for Civil Aviation Equipment.  It also 
shows that the ADIRU OPS software was DO-178B compliant.  
Even so, testing failed to consider the precise circumstances of 
the failure that was revealed in this incident.   The diagram also 
records an assumption that risk-based testing was unlikely to 
uncover an accelerometer failure resulting in high output, 
followed by power cycle, followed by a second high magnitude 
accelerometer failure while the high failed value was still on first 
accelerometer.  Although the consequences of such a scenario 
were potentially severe, such a contingency might arguably have 
been considered too unlikely to be considered in detail during 
system testing.   It is, however, difficult for the ATSB and other 
investigatory organisations to confirm such analyses without 
access to detailed design process information that is likely to be 
commercially sensitive.  
 
This incident reiterates the importance of considering the impact 
of multiple component faults in the requirements that are used to 
guide the development of fault tolerant software, especially 
where fault-masking techniques shield operational personnel 
from additional complexity between maintenance cycles.   This 
might seem like a very specific issue.  However, the incident 
reveals important lessons for engineers, which highlights the 
more general need for them to read accident and incident reports 
[2].   It was fortunate that in the case study incident, the crew 
were able to land their aircraft.   However, unless software 
engineers are made aware of the circumstances surrounding this 
and similar incidents, there is a danger that future avionics 
software will continue to suffer from the flaws of previous 
systems.  
 
This incident illustrates the strengths and the weaknesses of 
current certification standards for commercial systems 
containing aviation software.  The ADIRU software had been 
tested and developed to the standard required at the time of 
certification. DO-178B, in common with most recent software 
standards across the safety-critical industries, focuses on 
development processes rather than the certification of particular 
lines of code.   In particular, it contains requirements to ensure 
the testing of delivered code against the original safety 
requirements identified for that software.   The level of testing is 
partly determined by the risks that are to be mitigated by the 
functionality of the code.   However, the ADIRU testing “was 
limited to the original specification and requirements of the 
component” [1, p. 16].  These did not consider the particular 
scenario that arose during the incident.   This has important 
implications for process based standards such as DO-178B.    In 
previous generations of product based specifications, the failure 
of a particular system was symptomatic of potential flaws in that 
particular component.  However, in process based certification 
the failure of a system implies that there may be wider flaws in 
the systems developed under that process.   It is for this reason 
that the manufacturer responded to the incident not simply by 
correcting for the particular combination of accelerometer 
failures that characterized this mishap, but by also reviewing the 
handling of a wide range of potential multiple hardware failures.  
8 Conclusions and Further Work 
This paper has described how fault tolerant software can 
automatically redirect input from failed components to 
redundant resources, providing important benefits.   In 
particular, fault-tolerance supports the continued provision of 
critical services and can be used to extend the interval between 
maintenance procedures.  Fault masking implies that information 
about the reconfiguration of redundant resources may be hidden 
from the crew and from maintenance teams during the interval 
between these procedures.  This offers further benefits.   Fault 
masking will reduce the workload of the flight crew, by reducing 
the number of checklists that must be consulted in abnormal 
situations.   Maintenance teams can focus on those areas that 
require immediate attention.  By postponing other items until 
major service intervals they can reduce the time pressures that 
often complicate unscheduled maintenance procedures.    
 
However, the benefits of fault masking in redundant systems 
also create new hazards.  When service teams fail to identify 
underlying failures during major maintenance procedures, 
aircraft may continue to be operated without the additional 
assurance provided by redundancy.  The potential consequences 
of this hazard are compounded by the effects of fault masking 
for operational staff.   They will not be aware of the underlying 
faults that affect their application.  When subsequent failures 
finally compromise the use of redundant systems, flight crews 
will be faced with unanticipated problems.   The very fact that 
the initial fault has been masked implies that any secondary 
failure will also not be covered in training and documentation 
that usually support their interaction. 
 
This paper is part of wider initiatives that are intended to assess 
the impact of what can be called ‘degraded modes of operation’ 
on safety-critical applications.   Degraded modes of operation 
refer to situations in which efforts are made to maintain levels of 
service in the presence of component failures.  In other 
industries, including Air Traffic Management, these can include 
ad hoc workarounds as staff learn to avoid the constraints that 
might otherwise be placed on them by faulty equipment [5].  The 
case study described in this paper extends our analysis to 
consider the impact that fault tolerant software can have upon 
complex applications during degraded modes of operation.   By 
masking previous failures, maintenance staff and operators may 
not recognize the gradual erosion of the safety mechanisms that 
are intended to support normal operation.  
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